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The international fossil fuel divestment norm formulates a standard of appropriate behaviour to with-
draw investments from fossil fuel assets and reinvest them into climate-friendly solutions. Its ultimate
objective is to take away the industry’s “social licence to operate”. In other words, the norm funda-
mentally questions the legitimacy of an industry because of its major impact on climate change. This
paper offers a neo-Gramscian view as to how a radical divestment norm seeks to delegitimise the role of
fossil fuels and the industry in society and how it only partly succeeds in doing so. This analytical
interpretation of norm diffusion offers a rich understanding of the discursive and relational aspects of
energy transitions and how societal consent to elite practicesdand not just their coercive powerdis
pivotal in successfully maintaining or transitioning away from a fossil fuel-based society. I trace the
origins and analyse the current state of the campaign and argue that four drivers are key to under-
standing norm diffusion: (legitimacy of) norm entrepreneurs; framing and discursive contestation; po-
litical opportunity structures; extant normative environment. I conclude that although there is certainly
room for counter-hegemonic norm articulation, the constraining effects of a liberal social order, epi-
tomised by liberal environmentalism, reduces its radical aspects to a passive revolution.
© 2019 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of KeAi Communications Co., Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In recent years, the beginning of a global normative turn against
fossil fuels has been taking place. A variety of transnational cam-
paigns are now formulating “anti-fossil fuel norms” that prescribe
the phase-out and ultimate prohibition of practices and processes
across the entire fossil fuel supply chain of ﬁnancing, extraction,
processing and consumption, based on moral and ethical grounds
[1]. Such a normative approach to climate action originates in
criticism that long-time dominant consequentialist approach,
which favours economic incentives and interest-based consider-
ations, has largely failed to generate effective climate governance
[2,3,77].
One such anti-fossil fuel norm in particular is fossil fuelvier on behalf of KeAi
ing by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Ke
d/4.0/).divestment (FFD). The FFD normdand the transnational campaign
promoting itdcalls upon investors to liquidate their stocks, bonds,
and other investments from companies connected to the extraction
of fossil fuels for both ﬁnancial, environmental and ethical reasons.
The norm originated at US college campuses around 2011 and was
subsequently popularised and internationalised through a
campaign of the NGO 350.org, led by [4,5,75].1 In December 2018,
the campaignmarked its 1000th divestment announcement, with a
total of almost US$ 8 trillion in assets having been declared “fossil
free”.2 It is the largest and fastest growing divestment campaign in
history [6]. Today, the rapid diffusion of the FFD norm has even
stirred debates in fossil fuel board rooms, with warnings that their
“business model” is under threat from divestment campaigns1 The overarching aim is to divest from the “Carbon Underground 200”. These are
the top 100 public coal companies globally and the top 100 public oil and gas
companies globally, ranked by the potential carbon emissions content of their re-
ported reserves [71].
2 As of 11 October 2019, 1118 institutions, with an approximate value of US$ 11.48
trillion, have committed to divest [41]. Note that the actual amount of direct
divestment is far less than this.
Ai Communications Co., Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
4 “Norm institutionalisation” refers to the degree to which a norm is discursively
embraced and accepted by the relevant norm addressees. Evidence of discursive
acceptance can be found in treaties and conventions, agreements, rules and stan-
dards established by states and international organisations, resolutions,

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diffusion of this norm, and what are its likely future prospects? In
this paper, I bring together constructivist perspectives and neo-
Gramscian theory on norm diffusion to address these questions.
To date, social science research on FFD mostly approaches the
campaign from a social movement perspective, with an explicit
focus on the energy and climate justice aspects and the effects so far
of the (transnational) FFD movement. However, there is a clear
research bias on this “activist branch” of the movement with 350.
org and other grassroots campaigners as norm entrepreneurs,
working at universities and other mission-driven institutions,
including charities and religious organisations [4,8,82]. However, if
the FFD campaign is to have any real impact on the ground, other
norm addressees (i.e. agents who are governed by a norm), such as
institutional investors, banks, insurers and other ﬁnancial in-
stitutions will have to accept the norm. These actors wield far more
power and inﬂuence in the ﬁnancial system and should be
considered pivotal norm addressees [9e11]. This study prioritises
the role and impact of these ﬁnance actors and their interaction
with the FFD norm.
The FFD norm seeks to stigmatise and delegitimise the fossil fuel
industry because of its historical responsibility in climate change
[12]. Essentially, its objective is to “take away the fossil fuel
industry’s social licence to operate” by addressing the ﬁnancial
streams that underpin them, in order to undermine the structural
power that they wield and that allows them to continue their
extractive operations [5,13]. It also seeks to change the narrative
about climate change, and is an example of what Reinsborough and
Canning [14] call “story-based strategy”.3 FFD was born out of the
critique that the story that was told on climate change before
tended to foreground individualistic solutions and techno-ﬁxes to
climate change. FFD challenges this narrative by pointing to the
fossil fuel industry and their entanglement with ﬁnancial and po-
litical actors, as the key driving force behind climate change.
Because of the campaign’s strong focus on “social licence” and
its roots in the climate justice movement, a neo-Gramscian addi-
tion to constructivist accounts of norm diffusion in International
Relations (IR) is helpful in understanding its development and
potential impact. Unlike other Marxist perspectives, in a neo-
Gramscian understanding ideas and norms are relevant because
power is not exclusively coercive or economic, but also derives from
institutional and discursive forces [78]; 128. In essence, it argues
that the hegemony of a dominant social group, is grounded in its
discursive, organisational and material power. This theory thus
posits that broad-based societal legitimacy, alongside coercion, is
key to the perpetuated social status quo in which political and
economic elites maintain their dominance, or hegemony [16,17]. In
turn, this means that processes of delegitimation, e.g. through the
formulation of AFFNs, can be key to achieving social and normative
change that is associated with a global energy transformation [1];
Newell 2019).
I argue that the FFD originated as a radical “counter-hegemonic”
norm. The FFD norm ﬁrmly went against established (neo)liberal
market norms that prioritise proﬁt over normative and moral
considerations. Paradoxically, however, the FFD norm will likely
diffuse further when norm proponents can convince relevant norm
addressees (i.e. institutional investors) of the positive material ef-
fects of divestment, that is if it maximises proﬁts and minimises
investment risks. In other words, the FFD norm operates within the
boundaries permissible of the social order that grants primacy to
those norms that do not go against the normative objectives of
dominant norm addressees. In such a case, the counter-hegemonic3 I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to my attention.norm, and the campaign that promotes the norm, becomes subject
to a process of passive revolutiondor, “reforms from above”d-
where a dominant group implements supposed concessions in an
effort to preserve the essentials of the existing social structure.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, I
discuss how a synthesis of constructivist and neo-Gramscian ap-
proaches can contribute to the theoretical understanding of inter-
national norm diffusion processes. After a short note on method
and data collection, in the empirical part of the paper, I provide an
in-depth and theoretically informed discussion on the main inﬂu-
encing factors for norm diffusion: (the legitimacy of) norm entre-
preneurs, framing strategies and discursive contestation, political
opportunity structures, and, most importantly, the constraining
effects of the extant liberal social structure. In a last section, I reﬂect
on the ﬁndings and formulate some theoretical and empirical im-
pacts of this exercise.
2. Bridging agency-centred and structural accounts of norm
diffusion
2.1. Constructivist views on norm diffusion
Like other international norms, anti-fossil fuel norms formulate
“standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given iden-
tity” [18]; 891). AFFNs formulate behavioural standards for actors
concernedwith the effect of fossil fuels on climate change, and they
prescribe the phase-out and ultimate prohibition of practices and
processes across the entire fossil fuel supply chain of ﬁnancing,
extraction, processing and consumption. The behavioural pre-
scriptions emanating from this speciﬁc FFD norm are that investors
can no longer be involved in fossil fuel ﬁnancing activities,
including loans, underwriting or (re)insurance, buying stocks and
bonds, etc. The FFD norm also has explicit moral aspirations. The
original rallying cry “if it’s wrong to wreck the planet, it is wrong to
proﬁt from this wreckage” exempliﬁes these ethical considerations
[13]. Other AFFNs that have emerged recently e.g. articulated bans
on new oil and gas exploration [19], fossil fuel subsidy reform [20],
or the phase-out of internal combustion engine vehicles [21].
At the outset of the constructivist turn in IR, scholarship on
norms sought to establish that they have independent causal effect
in international politics and it established theories on norm diffu-
sion through processes of socialisation that eventually could lead to
“norm institutionalisation”4 (see e.g. [18,49]. However, this schol-
arship was quickly criticised for its lack of a theory of agency. It
overemphasised the role of social structures and political oppor-
tunity structures5 at the expense of the agents who help create and
promote them in the ﬁrst place [22]. Moreover, it treated norms as
stable and constant phenomena, leaving only marginal space for
the mutually constitutive effect of agency on norm dynamics [23];
24).
Subsequent research thus shifted the focus to understanding
norms as products of strategic social construction and to the
identiﬁcation of agency-centred mechanisms that help explain
norm diffusion and institutionalisation, including the role of norm
entrepreneurs, discursive contestation, legitimacy, etc. (see e.g.
[23,24,49]. This new wave of norm research granted primacy tocommuniques and declarations [27]; 30).
5 Finnemore and Sikkink refer to this as “world-time context”, while others have
used the terms “critical conjunctures” (Collier and Collier 1991, 29), “triggering
events” [72]; 325), or “extrinsic events” [23]; 30).
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argued, structures only provide windows of opportunity and
“agency [i.e., norm entrepreneurs] is essential for norm change to
take place” [23]; 30; see also [18]; 897). The most persuasive norm
entrepreneurs are those able to “frame” normative ideas in such a
way that they “resonate” with relevant audiences.
The question then is: Why are some frames more persuasive
than others? Here, the constructivist literature provides only a
partial answer: because some frames ﬁt well with already accepted
norms, or in other words, the “normative environment” (see e.g.
[25]; 55 for an overview; [26]. But in the end, this raises the
question of what exactly this normative environmentdor social
structuredlooks like and what norms, ideas and interests consti-
tute it.2.2. Toward a neo-Gramscian understanding of norm diffusion
A focus on the extant social and normative structures offers a
much richer perspective on why certain norms matter more than
others, or how norms interact with other factors, such as material
interests and power. Hence, in order to complement the agency-
centred constructivist scholarship on norms, one needs to look at
theoretical frameworks that highlight the interplay between norms
and structure, especially the normative underpinnings of dominant
political economic forces [27]. Here, a neo-Gramscian approach
offers a good extension of such agency-centred accounts because of
its extensive conceptualisation of what such a normative environ-
ment looks like.
A neo-Gramscian account not only sheds light on the drivers of
norm diffusion and institutionalisation, it also offers an in-depth
understanding of how ideas and norms interact with the broader
economic structure and associated constellations of power. Hege-
mony is a key notion here. It refers to the persistence of speciﬁc
social and economic structures that systematically advantage
certain social groups, the so-called “historical bloc” [28]. Crucially,
hegemony is contingent on coercive control by elites, as well as on
political and ideational accommodation by other social groups. As
Cox [28]; 137) notes, “Hegemony is expressed in universal norms,
institutions, and mechanisms which lay down general rules of
behaviour for states, and for those forces of civil society that act
across national boundaries.” An idea is hegemonic once it has won
legitimacy over alternative ways of looking at society and broadly
sets limits on what are considered acceptable ways of addressing
social challenges faced by society.
Norms thus form a crucial part of the basis through which non-
elites authorise and legitimate the dominant positions of certain
social groups. For Gramsci, the disagreements, concessions and
alliances inherent to political struggles are generally negotiated
against a backdrop of broad-based societal consent to and accep-
tance of hegemonic ideas [15]. In other words, hegemony is ulti-
mately contingent on popular consent and legitimacy and can be
destabilised by “counter-hegemonic” strategies. Such strategies
entail the development of ideas, norms and discourse to challenge
dominant assumptions, beliefs and established patterns of behav-
iour [29].6 If one manages to change prevailing norms and cultural
preferences, e.g. about ﬂying, eatingmeat or fossil fuel investments,
one can indirectly undermine the respective aviation, meat and
fossil fuel industries’ social licence to operate, and therefore the
hegemonic position of these actors that form a historical bloc.6 The radical anti-globalisation protests of the late 1990s e early 2000s are an
example of such a counter-hegemony. Its focus was to challenge the policies, norms
and discourses around the “Washington Consensus” of a neoliberal one-size-ﬁts-all
economic policy for the developing world [29].In this neo-Gramscian understanding of norms, existing con-
stellations of power and the associated hegemonic ideas and norms
privilege certain newly formulated norms over others. This sets
limits to what is politically achievable within a particular social
order, meaning that there is no such thing as “unconstrained
agency” [30,31]. According to Bernstein [27]; 179) (environmental)
norm entrepreneurs will be most successful if they nest norms into
the broader international social structure”, of “liberal environ-
mentalism” [27]. This would result in what Gramsci has dubbed a
“passive revolution”, where the initial counter-hegemonic initiative
or norm is hampered by a process of reformist changes by hege-
monic groups, without any fundamental concessions in an effort to
preserve the essential aspects of social structure’’ [32].
A holistic approach that combines new insights from agency-
centred constructivist accounts and those from more structural
neo-Gramscian accounts will therefore allow for a deep under-
standing of the drivers behind the uptake and diffusion of the FFD
norm, as well as both the promise and limits of FFD in a structurally
constrained normative environment. I put forward four factors,
based on the extant literature on norm diffusion, that likely have an
effect on the emergence and diffusion of the FFD norm. First, I start
with the importance of the (legitimacy) of norm entrepreneurs and
their discursive framing strategies, as important agency-centred
drivers of norm diffusion. Subsequently, I highlight the relevance
of political opportunity structures for norm entrepreneurs to
capitalise on. Lastly, I discuss the constraining effects of a prevailing
liberal economic order. In line with Bernstein [27] and [15,78]; this
analysis grants primacy to the “ideational hegemony within
particular world orders,” especially the hegemony of liberal eco-
nomic ideas and structures.
Table 1 provides a structured overview of the different drivers
and constraints behind the emergence and diffusion of the FFD
norm.3. Methods and data collection
I conduct a disciplined-conﬁgurative case study (Eckstein 1975)
through a theory-testing process-tracing analysis of the FFD norm
[33]; 14e16). This type of case study involves the application to a
case, or cases, of a pre-established framework for analysis. The aim
is to “interpret or explain an event by applying a known theory to
new terrain” [34]; 163). I follow a theory-ﬁrst path that tests
different drivers of norm diffusion and their associated mecha-
nisms to see whether they can provide a sufﬁcient explanation for
the development of the FFD norm. By tracing the process of FFD
norm development, the main claims add to a theoretical synthesis
between neo-Gramscian and constructivist account of norm
diffusion.
Within-case evidence was collected from primary and second-
ary sources through document analysis, expert interviews and
participant observation. Secondary data comes from the growing
body of academic literature and journalistic accounts that exist on
the origins and development of the FFD movement. For primary
data collection, I identiﬁed and consulted relevant open-source
material, including position statements, ofﬁcial documents and
reports of relevant actors (FFD campaigners, ﬁnancial industry and
fossil fuel industry). I also conducted expert interviews withTable 1
Driving and constraining forces behind FFD norm emergence and diffusion.
Structure Agency
- Political opportunity structures - (Legitimacy of) norm entrepreneurs
- Normative environment - Framing and discursive contestation
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the United Kingdom and Belgium. To compensate for the absence of
interviews with fossil fuel companies, I examined publicly available
statements from members and representatives of the industry,
which can easily be accessed, e.g. through the website
divestmentfacts.com, a project of the Independent Petroleum As-
sociation of America, or in media reporting on FFD.
I also relied on the method of participant observation [35], as I
was personally involved in fossil fuel divestment campaigns at
several universities in Belgium, notably those at Ghent University
and the KU Leuven, between September 2016 and October 2018. I
participated in public recruitment events, panel discussions, or
roundtables organised by local chapters of the “Fossil Free”
campaign. The informal discussions that I had with participants,
activists, and panel members from the ﬁnance industry or asset
managers of the universities themselves, throughout these events,
are also used to complement the study of evidence. These experi-
ences were mostly used for background information and to ﬁll gaps
in the sequence of events. I do not claim to come to this from an
uninﬂuenced perspective. Nonetheless, I balanced this potential
personal bias through data triangulation with other primary
research and a survey of the literature on divestment.4. Drivers of norm diffusion
4.1. (Legitimacy of) norm entrepreneurs and leaders
In line with previous norm scholarship, the diffusion of inter-
national norms is partly determined by norm entrepreneurs’ stat-
ure and legitimacy among relevant norm addressees and the
broader relevant political economic actors (see e.g. [15,18,26,36,37].
Finnemore and Sikkink [18]; 906 emphasise that norm inﬂuence
in world politics is contingent on the qualitydor prominencedof
the actors promoting it. First, materially powerful actors have ad-
vantages if they want to promote a new norm, simply because they
have more opportunities “to persuade others of the rightness of
their views” [26]; 375. Second, however, norm entrepreneurs can
also be seen as successful and desirable models for others to follow,
without having to tap into traditional material power resources.
Scandinavian countries in world politics, for example, have func-
tioned as norm entrepreneurs in promotion of environmental and
security norms, in part “precisely because of [their] limitedmaterial
capabilities” [38]; 13.
The perception of a norm entrepreneur’s prominence, refers to
what Buchanan and Keohane [39]; 405dubbed their “sociological
legitimacy”, or the acceptance of the rule-making authority [of
norm entrepreneurs] among norm addressees.7 Likewise, Barnett’s
[37] conceptualisation of “procedural legitimacy”, referring to who
created the norm and the stature of those advocating it, also un-
derscores the importance of real or perceived prominence of norm
entrepreneurs and leaders.
Now, who have been the norm entrepreneurs associated with
the FFD norm and what has their impact been? Starting around
2011, the FFD norm was grafted onto the global political agenda
thanks largely to the work of several NGOs, acting as norm entre-
preneurs. In 2011, a student group at Swarthmore College in
Pennsylvania launched the ﬁrst campaign for divestment from
fossil fuels (coal in particular) in US higher education. In several7 According to Buchanan and Keohane [39]; 405), “legitimacy” has both a
normative and sociological meaning. To say an actor has normative legitimacy, is to
assert that is has the right to develop rules. If an actor possesses sociological
legitimacy, it is believed to have the right to develop rules. For a brief overview of
differences between these two types of legitimacy, see Ref. [73].other colleges and universities divestment campaigns started.
Student activists were subsequently joined by a campaign, spear-
headed by climate activist Bill McKibben and 350.org, an NGO he
founded a few years before.
In a viral Rolling Stone Magazine article, McKibben [5] pop-
ularised the idea that the world was carrying a “carbon bubble”,
similar to the “housing” and “dotcom” bubbles that led to severe
economic turmoil in 2008. He adopted the idea from a report by the
Carbon Tracker Initiative (CTI), a London-based ﬁnancial think tank.
In this 2011 report, CTI had argued that the ﬁnancial prospects of
fossil fuel investments were in peril and that fossil fuel assets risked
becoming “stranded” as the shift to a low-carbon economy was
accelerating [40].
From the US, the primarily student- and youth-led movement
quickly expanded to campuses around the world and expanded to
include supporters among other mission-driven investors, such as
religious groups, local councils, universities and philanthropic
foundations. Through its 2015 “Keep it in the ground” campaign,
the British newspaper The Guardian gave the campaign a high
amplitude loudspeaker to get is message out. And in just four years,
the transnational campaign grew from US$ 52 billion of assets
declared fossil free to almost US$ 8 trillion. 350.org keeps track of
divestment pledges and policies around the world: In December
2018, the 1000th divestment commitment since the beginning of
the campaign was announced. Fig. 1 highlights the most notable
institutional commitments and endorsements by high-level in-
dividuals thus far.
In the ﬁrst phase, the most prominent norm entrepreneur of the
FFD normwas 350.org, as the organisation that set up the “Go Fossil
Free” campaign and that orchestrates local campaigns at mission-
driven institutions [42]. As a grassroots NGO, they are arguable
most inﬂuential in these circles. According to their website,
Gofossilfree.org, the vast majority of divestment decisions come
from these organisations, accounting for roughly 4/5 of all com-
mitments. Other commitments can be attributed to pension funds
and for-proﬁt corporations, mainly insurance companies [41].
According to one interviewee, a ﬁnancial analyst in the City and
currently working at CTI, these grassroots campaigners function
best as norm entrepreneurs that appeal to mission-driven in-
stitutions, because of their moral objectives (Personal interview #1,
2018). However, as these institutions essentially hold only a small
part of all fossil fuel assets, they are not the only norm addressees to
address. Ansar et al. [6]; 56) calculate that all university endow-
ments worldwide represent just under US$ 450 billion of assets
under management, out of a total of a US$ 212 trillion global
ﬁnancial stock. This of course is a negligible amount. Hansen and
Pollin [43] found that currently assets committed to divestment are
at about US$ 36 billion while total global private fossil fuel assets
stand at US$ 4.9 trillion.
Consequently, the norm will also have to speak to a ﬁnance
audience, including bankers, insurers, asset managers, ﬁnancial
advisers etc. However, given original confrontational and moral
approach, the message of FFD campaigners can be more easily
delegitimised by these proﬁt-focussed actors. For example, asset
managers and other agents argue that they are bound by a “ﬁdu-
ciary duty” in order to dismiss moral pressures to divest [44]. And
even for those that choose to (partly) divest, it remains very unclear
to what extent the decision is causally linked to grassroots cam-
paigners that operate under the umbrella of the campaigning
platforms of 350.org.
That is why CTI, as a ﬁnancial think tank, enhances the legiti-
macy and impact of the normative campaign among these more
proﬁt-driven norm addressees. Bernstein and Cashore [45]; 360
note that enlisting such business or ﬁnance-grounded organisa-
tions increases the credibility of a normative campaign among
Fig. 1. High-level FFD commitments and endorsements: timetable Source: Own creation, based on Gofossilfree. org [41].
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respondent at CTI observed that “the ﬁnancial audience are […] the
people that we need to persuade, they are the people with the
money and those who lie at the heart of the capitalist system”
(Personal interview #1, 2018). Consequently, in order to increase its
legitimacy among these actors, CTI reports on the ﬁnancial aspects
related to energy transitions to help the investment community
better understand the ﬁnancial implications of tackling climate
change. Other research organisations such as Bloomberg New En-
ergy Finance and the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial
Analysis also fulﬁl such a role. I will come back to what the pro-
motion of a ﬁnance narrative by these actors means for the norm’s
diffusion in the following section.
On top of this norm entrepreneurship, the early and enthusiastic
support of important, materially powerful norm leaders is also
critical for the further diffusion of the norm [18]; 895. Hence, norm
diffusion received a proverbial shot in the armwith a pivotal speech
made by Bank of England Governor Mark Carney’s on climate
change and ﬁnancial stability in 2015 [46]. There, Carney asserted
that investors were at risk of signiﬁcant exposure to stranded assets
and that frameworks to disclose and manage these climate-relatedrisks were to be developed. In the years prior, he hadmet on several
occasions with the people at CTI, as one person noted, “He went on
to make his own speech on ‘unburnable carbon’ a phrase taken
straight from our ﬁrst report” (Personal interview #2, 2018). The
sociological legitimacy among an audience of investors, insurers
and central bankers of the Governor of the Bank of England could
hardly be underestimated.
Together with the rise and diffusion of neoliberal globalisation,
institutional investors’ role in global ﬁnancial markets has also
been growing, to the point that they now also exercise great in-
ﬂuence on ﬁnancial decision-making regarding environmental and
social performance of ﬁrms they invest in Refs. [9,11]. A case in
point is the March 2019 decision of the Norwegian Government
Pension Fund to divest its holdings in extraction and production
companies in the energy sector. Although this decision affects US$ 8
billion worth of shares in 134 companiesdabout 1.2% of the fund’s
stock holdings [47]dif such a large institutional investor divests
from speciﬁc sectors of industries, this is bound to alert other in-
vestors and the industry itself, much more than if a group of
grassroots campaigners succeeds in convincing a college to divest
its endowment, as a respondent at CTI suggested.
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factor that impacts norm diffusion, the force of articulation also
matters. In the next section, I explore this in terms of the different
strategic frames that are employed to promote the fossil fuel
divestment norm.
4.2. Framing strategies and discursive contestation
Finnemore and Sikkink [18]; 897 assert that “the construction of
[cognitive] frames is an essential component of norm entrepre-
neurs’ political strategies.” In a context of norm-building and
diffusion, “Frames provide a singular interpretation of a particular
situation and then indicate appropriate behaviour for that context”
[48]; 39.” Accordingly, frames have a dual quality of both inter-
preting a problem in a distinctive way and articulating potential
solutions in order to solve that particular problem. The most
persuasive and successful norm entrepreneurs are those that are
able to frame normative ideas in such away that they resonatewith
the norm addressees (i.e. those to be governed by a norm). I pri-
oritise ﬁnancial actors are the primary norm addressees, including
pension funds, hedge funds, endowments, other institutional in-
vestors, asset managers, ﬁnanciers or insurers.
In constructing their frames, norm entrepreneurs face opposi-
tion from ﬁrmly embedded norms and frames that create alterna-
tive perceptions of both appropriateness and interest (external
contestation). There can also be contestation among the supporters
of the norm themselves (internal contestation), often on matters of
deﬁnition [49]. Here I argue that through the different framing
strategies and the variety of means to implement the norm, FFD
appeals to a large group of actors, which in turn helps expedite the
diffusion process.
Broadly four frames of FFD can be distinguished [50]. First, a
“war and enemy” frame is mostly dominant in grassroots activist
circles and depicts the fossil fuel industry as “enemies” that have to
be fought [51]. Second, a “moral” frame denounces fossil fuel in-
cumbents’ immoral behaviour regarding their historic re-
sponsibility in climate change and their continued search for
proﬁts. This is epitomised by the rallying cry, “if it’s wrong to wreck
the planet, it’s wrong to proﬁt from this wreckage”. A third frame is
that of (climate) justice [52,81]. This frame situates fossil fuels in
relation to the unequal impacts of climate change. Climate change
is happening everywhere, but it is negatively affecting certain
groups disproportionately: poor people and ethnic minorities in
developed economies, as well as developing countries in the Global
South in general. A fourth, “ﬁnance” frame, is substantively less
related to the other three, and refers to the beneﬁcial economic
effects on ﬁnancial portfolios of divestment.
A major element of the ﬁrst three frames is the explicit focus on
undermining the moral legitimacy of the fossil fuel industry’s po-
sition of power. These frames are also mostly employed in divest-
ment campaigns directed at mission-driven institutions because
they are considered to be more susceptible to such non-ﬁnancial
arguments. Other types of investors are more susceptible to the
ﬁnance frame [50]. This frame actually merits greater attention
than it is often attributed in academic literature on FFD (see e.g.
[42]. As the former CEO of CTI, observed, “most investment man-
dates would not permit exclusion of a sector on purely ethical
grounds” [53]. For example, the Norwegian national pension fund
referred to climate change as an “important ﬁnancial risk factor”
rather than a moral incentive when it announced that it would
divest from exploration and production companies in the energy
sector. The divestment decision was taken to help to ensure the
fund’s would not increase the country’s exposure to future ﬂuctu-
ating oil prices.
Carney’s speech strengthened the ﬁnancial frame for FFD, as itlinked traditional ﬁnancial concepts of risk management, portfolio
diversiﬁcation, and stranded assets to climate change [46].
Stranded assets are fossil fuel supply assets (reserves, pipelines,
reﬁneries, power plants, etc.) that become uneconomic prior to the
end of their expected economic life, mainly due to climate policy
(regulatory stranding), competition from renewables (economic
stranding) or environmental risks (physical stranding). Conse-
quently, these assets are currently overvalued and could generate a
“carbon bubble”, similar to the historical housing or dotcom bub-
bles that, when they burst, led to economic recession [40,54].
This ﬁnance frame therefore has two main advantages. As I
noted in section 4.1., it raises the issue of divestment within a group
of norm leaders and addressees that, in general, tend to be less
concerned with climate change, or more broadly, ethical issues in
general: the “ﬁnance actors”, including large asset owners, for-
proﬁt corporations, asset managers, and ﬁnancial advisors. For
the ﬁrst time, a divestment campaign does not need to solely
advance its message through moral outrage [83], but it can employ
ﬁnancial metaphors and arguments to “appeal to the self-interest of
investors” [50]; 198). Although there is still no conclusive evidence
that fossil fuel divestment leads to improved ﬁnancial outcomes
([55,79,80]), institutional investors are increasingly aware of the
ﬁnancial uncertainties associated with energy transition and have
already started to alter their risk preferences in fossil fuel projects
[56,57].
A second advantage of such a ﬁnance frame is that it can lead to
institutional engagement with ﬁnance strategies that address the
issue of climate change, without necessarily having to invoke the
principle of divestment. In 2015, the G20 Finance Ministers asked
the Financial Stability Board, which Mark Carney chaired at the
time, to consider how the ﬁnancial sector could take account of the
risks climate change poses to our ﬁnancial system. Large ﬁnancial
institutions soon followed suit. Actors such as HSBC, Goldman
Sachs, Citigroup and others have since issued reports on how to
manage climate-related ﬁnancial risks, both with regard to their
own fossil fuel investments or assets managed for third parties [58].
In the slipstream of the divestment campaign, Follow This, a
Netherlands-based group of activist shareholders has convinced
some oil majors to increase climate disclosure. Instead of selling
shares, these campaigners actually buy them to exert pressure on
corporate management [76]. Importantly, shareholder activism and
divestment need not be mutually exclusive, as shareholder activists
have noted that fossil fuel divestment could be used as ameasure of
last resort should their strategy of engagement fail [59].
These different frames also lead to a variety of practical imple-
mentations of the FFD norm. Table 2 gives a non-exhaustive over-
view of different implementation strategies. Because norm
addressees can choose between a variety of strategies, ranging from
very radical interpretations of divestment to less stringent mea-
sures that include only the biggest “polluters” being shunned, this
can expedite the norm’s diffusion.
The observation that framing strategies have a dual quality of
both interpreting a problem in a distinctive way and articulating
potential solutions in order to solve the identiﬁed social issue, ap-
plies to this ﬁnance frame as well. It interprets climate change and
the role of fossil fuel companies as a ﬁnancial risk of stranded assets
and ﬁduciary duty, rather than as a normative or moral issue, which
in turn requires classic ﬁnancial tools and solutions, such as asset
and risk diversiﬁcation.
In doing so, the ﬁnance frame in itself already alters the content
and outcomes of the norm. Arguably, this frame causes norm
change because it undermines the initial counter-hegemonic na-
ture of the FFD norm (i.e. delegitimation of the fossil fuel industry),
in that it considers fossil fuel assets as toxic investments, rather
than considering the normative and moral responsibility of the
Table 2
Variety of divestment strategies.
Exclusion target or objective Implementation strategy Examples
All fossil fuels - Exclusion of all companies involved in the extraction of coal, oil and gas. - Edinburgh University; Church of
Sweden
Coal - Exclusion of companies deriving certain percentage of their revenue from coal operations. - Norwegian pension fund; Axa
Group
- Halting ﬁnancing or underwriting of coal- ﬁred power plants - World Bank; EBRD
“Extreme” fossil fuels - Exclusion of companies that engage in deepwater drilling, oil extraction from tar sands, or fracking of
shale oil and gas,
- Georgetown University; Oxford
University
“Carbon Underground 200” - Exclusion of the top 200 coal, oil and gas reserve owners in the world - Ghent University
Non-alignment with Paris
Agreement
- Exclusion of companies whose strategies are not aligned with the Paris Agreement (i.e. >2 C). - Church of England
Portfolio Decarbonisation - Reduce carbon-intensity of investments or assets under management. Or, reduce the carbon foot-
print per Euro/Dollar invested.
- University of Ottawa
Author’s creation, based on Finley-Brook and Holloman and Gofossilfree.org [41,60].
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structural factors that provide a full account of the uptake and
diffusion of the FFD norm in order to explain where this ﬁnancial
framing strategy originates and how it is impacted by the extant
normative environment.4.3. Political opportunity structures
Norm entrepreneurs and leaders do not exist in a vacuum, but
instead operate in shifting structural contexts. Not only do they
engage with other actors, they also propose norms in speciﬁc social
structures that have their own, independent impact on norm
diffusion. Such contextual factors are captured by the term “polit-
ical opportunity structures”, which can be understood as the spe-
ciﬁc conﬁguration of resources, institutional arrangements and
historical precedents that are external to norm entrepreneurs and
that facilitate the development of norms in some instances or
constrain them in others [61]; 58).8 They typically include crises or
focussing events, but are not limited to that. Crises can occur in the
problem stream, through e.g. technological (r)evolutions, oil price
shocks, environmental catastrophes; or in the political stream, e.g.
failure of existing policies, political stalemate, or the election of a
new political leader [62]. Crisis situations can lead policy-makers to
question conventional policy wisdom that norm entrepreneurs can
capitalise on by framing the policy issue at hand in a new way in
order to open a window of opportunity for new policy ideas.
Fossil fuel divestment was already a topic of concern within the
insurance industry as early as the 1990s. Greenpeace attemp-
teddbut faileddto convince the insurance industry that climate
change threatened its proﬁtability and that it should switch its
investments away from fossil fuels towards renewable energy
[63,64].9 Political opportunity structures is probably what earlier
attempts focus on fossil fuel divestment missed in order to
convince norm addressees. The reason why the divestment
movement only really gained traction in the past few years could be
that the political context, scientiﬁc knowledge, and public aware-
ness of climate change have altered substantially compared to the8 In their seminal article on the international dynamics of norms, Finnemore and
Sikkink [18]; 909) refer to this as the “world time-context” that can be structurally
conducive to norm diffusion. In their understanding, such “[world] historical events
such as wars or major depressions in the international system can lead to a search
for new ideas and norms.” Other authors use terms such as “critical junctures”
(Collier and Collier 1991, 29), while Sandholtz and Stiles [72]; 325) refer to “trig-
gering events”.
9 There was another precursor to the current FFD campaign. In 2000 Ozone
Action targeted companies that were part of the Global Climate Coalition, a group of
large energy companies that opposed climate action. This campaign (helped) lead
to the dissolution of this organisation [74].1990s.
First, an increased sense of urgency around climate change
among norm entrepreneurs and leaders provided a conducive
context for the diffusion of the divestment. McKibben [5] referred
to the increase in natural disasters that were linked to climate
change to advocate for FFD. Moreover, the ﬁrst CTI reports built on
the work around the “carbon budget” to frame its concept of the
“carbon bubble”: the total amount of carbon dioxide the earth’s
atmosphere can absorb before the 1.5e2 C temperature goals
(around which political minds were converging) are breached.
Growing evidence that the effects of climate change were already
being felt at the time of establishing the campaign provided further
impetus to the divestment campaign.
Second, political stalemate, both domestically (in the US, where
the FFD norm originated) and internationally, further proved ad-
vantageous for the establishment of the FFD campaign, as it grew
from a general sense of frustration with conventional political
approach to climate change. The failure of the 2009 Copenhagen
Climate Summit, at which a successive agreement to the Kyoto
Protocol was to be agreed on, exempliﬁed the deadlock of tradi-
tional multilateral climate negotiations. This was due to the
competition between great powers there (especially the US and
China), as well as the inert nature of negotiations within the
context of Conferences of the Parties (COPs). Domestically, in the
US, disappointment with climate policies under the Obama
administration, as well as the 2009 failure of the Waxman-Markey
bill that was to impose a nationwide carbon cap-and-trade system
in the US, made campaigners look for an activist strategy outside
the classic political lobbying strategy.10
Third, the failure of conventional climate campaigning also
proved a crisis situation on which norm entrepreneurs could
capitalise. As McKibben [5] noted, “Green groups […]have spent a
lot of time trying to change individual lifestyles.” He argued that
this approach of individual culpability alienated the public because
“people perceive e correctly e that their individual actions will not
make a decisive difference in the atmospheric concentration of
CO2.” Consequently, McKibben argued, a divest campaign that laid
the blame with the fossil fuel industry rather than with individual
behaviour, could help reignite climate activism. After all, FFD is the
exact opposite of the typical climate strategy of controlling the
consumption of fossil fuels by a large number of consumers
through e.g. efﬁciency measures.
These different external factors: the increased urgency of the10 McKibben’s criticism on the domestic level climate policy-making was not only
directed at the US but other countries as well, including Canada for the develop-
ment of tar sands, and other countries where fossil fuel reserves are mostly held by
the state (such as Venezuela).
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the failure of conventional climate campaigning proved fruitful
political opportunities for norm entrepreneurs to frame the FFD
norm. Lastly, I will focus on the importance of a normative “ﬁt”with
the extant social structure as the decisive factor for a norm to take
root and diffuse.
4.4. Constraining effects of a liberal normative environment
The role of the extant normative environment and social
structure on the uptake and diffusion of norms has been dealt with
extensively in norm scholarship [26,49]. Indeed, ideas and norms
are most likely to be successfully diffused when norm and policy
entrepreneurs frame them in such a way that they ﬁt into the
broader international social structure. The social structure can be
deﬁned as the “broader sets of institutionalised norms that are
already accepted as legitimate bases of governance in the interna-
tional system” [65]; 8.
But what does this structure look like, and how does this affect
counter-hegemonic norms that are articulated? As Okereke [15]; 42
suggests, the viability of norms in the end depends on the extent to
which they remain “within the boundaries permissible by the
dominant liberal economic order.” This adherence to the hege-
monic liberal economic order is the decisive factor that shapes a
norm’s successful diffusion within the international system. This
section therefore broadly draws on [15,78] and Bernstein’s [27,65]
perspectives on norm dynamics. Bernstein [27] has dubbed the
existing liberal social order “liberal environmentalism”. In his un-
derstanding, international norms are more likely be institutional-
ised and implemented if they are predicated on the maintenance of
fundamental liberal market norms of free trade, open markets, or
the support of market instruments over regulatory mechanisms
and government intervention.
The focus on the integral interaction between (neo-)liberal
ideas, norms and social structure owes intellectual debt to a
Gramscian understanding of political change. This means that
norms that radically going against hegemonic ideas and norms that
held by dominant social groups in society can of course be
formulated, yet they will ﬁnd it much more difﬁcult to diffuse
among norm addressees that form part of a speciﬁc historical bloc.
Moreover, through a process of passive revolution, the counter-
hegemonic norm, as it was originally articulated, is translated
into reformist changes, without any fundamental concessions in an
effort to preserve the essential aspects of social structure. How
then, did the FFD norm originally challenge these ideas, and what
impedes the development of its radical, counter-hegemonic
components?
As I noted in section 4.2. On framing strategies, the “war and
enemy” frame, the “moral” frame, and the “climate justice” frame,
all three actually ﬁrmly contest the social norms associated with an
existing liberal order that prioritises considerations of risk mini-
misation, proﬁt maximisation and ﬁduciary duty toward asset
owners. As such, undermining the social licence of the fossil fuel
industry was the central objective of the norm. In that sense, the
FFD norm was decisively counter-hegemonic in nature.
Throughout the process of norm articulation and diffusion,
however, some developments have shown that a liberal normative
environment has actually severely constrained the development of
the radical aspects of the FFD norm. In addition to that, the tactics
and frames that are used by norm proponents to make the norm
“ﬁt” with the objectives of norm addressees, undermine the
counter-hegemonic character of the FFD norm.
In his ﬁrst call for divestment in 2012, McKibben already
signalled a general discontent with the political inaction regarding
the traditional regulative and policy-making approach to climatechange. After all, a divestment argument essentially entails that an
industry’s stigmatisation, and ultimately its phase-out, depends on
a “market strategy” of wielding the ﬁnancial power of investors.
The market, in other words, is considered the primary venue to
ﬁght the fossil fuel industry. That is, institutional investors have
gained such a prominent and important position in the global
economy that their ﬁnancial behaviourdthrough divest-
mentdultimately can have a more beneﬁcial political impact than
government action.
Their economic power should therefore be used in order to
induce political change. This is a clear endorsement of a funda-
mental aspect of liberal environmentalism, namely that market
strategies are favoured over direct government regulations or other
interventions [65]; 4). The FFD norm and the campaign’s embrace
of an approach that targets market actors instead of governments
“reﬂects a disillusionment with the capacities [and willingness] of
states to engage seriously with major environmental problems”
[42]; 375). In other words, market actors (i.e. investors, asset
managers, ﬁnancial advisers etc.) are as seen as the legitimate ac-
tors to promote and ultimately adopt the norm.
Indeed, there is a lack of serious engagement with governments
and the formulation of exact policy recommendations, but contrary
to what some have argued this certainly does not inhibit further
norm diffusion [42,84]. Consider the counter-factual of campaign-
ing for government-imposed restrictions on fossil fuel ﬁnance.
Such a denial of the market norm of “free movement of capital”
would surely be met with considerable contestation and would
inhibit norm acceptance by the said norm addressees. In a televised
debate in Belgium, the leader of the Green Party was accused of
“promoting communism” by the leader of the Conservative party
for suggesting that the government could impose restrictions on
(private) banks’ fossil fuel ﬁnance activities [66].
The FFD norm thus feeds into the normative development under
liberal environmentalism whereby social and political issues are
subject to a process of “marketisation” [67]. It builds on a
commonly held and dominant belief that social change can most
effectively, and proﬁtably, be achieved through market mecha-
nisms, as opposed to state-based rules placed on corporate
behaviour. In three interviews with leading FFD campaigners in
Belgium, they acknowledged that eventually, governments must be
made to legislate against the fossil fuel industry. However, this is
arguably much less the case for norm addressees such as large in-
vestors and asset managers. Essentially, the norm resonates with
them because, once “rebranded” as an issue of corporate social
responsibility (CSR), governments can be prevented from imposing
stricter legal action [68]. This feeds into the normative conviction of
liberal environmentalism that the market works more effectively to
solve social issues.
Granted, this does not mean that ﬁnance actors are not sus-
ceptible to moral arguments. Both do not have to be mutually
exclusive. Rather, it means that moral arguments are embedded
within a liberal logic whereby social, moral and political issues are
reframed as ﬁnancial issues. This becomes apparent from the ex-
periences of FFD campaigners. Even at mission-driven institutions
such as universities, as much as there was support for the moral
arguments, FFD discussions mostly centred around investment
returns and risk spreading.
For Ghent University, with an investment portfolio of around
V250 million, the internal divestment recommendation memo
notes, “the purpose is not to actively invest in sustainable sectors.
The University chooses to invest in funds that guarantee a spread of
ongoing investments and that do not signiﬁcantly increase the risk
proﬁle of investments […] The aim of the portfolio remains
achieving the best possible returns” [69]. In the end, moral con-
cerns are trumped by investment objectives and in during
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technical and ﬁnancial issue always (Personal Interview, 2019).
According to that same interviewee, labour union representatives
involved in the divestment discussions tended to highlight the
need for continued returns, given the material stake of the pension
fund in the fossil fuel economy.
Likewise, experiences of Harvard, Stanford, and Brown Univer-
sity, in the United States reﬂect the conﬂict between moral and
economic concerns [70]. The Harvard board considered the
endowment an economic resource and not an instrument to impel
social or political change, Brown University remained unconvinced
that the social harm inﬂicted by the fossil fuel industry outweighs
its social and economic beneﬁts, and although Stanford University
decided in 2014 to divest from coal, it rejected a request to divest its
entire endowment from the fossil fuel industry altogether in 2016
on similar grounds as Brown.
All in all, this means that even if (mission-driven) institutions
consider divestment, discussions mostly focus interest-based con-
siderations of risk management, proﬁt/return maximisation and
ﬁduciary duty. In other words, the very same technocratic debates
that are criticised by formulating an FFD norm, are what underpin
discussions among campaigners and decision-makers. This implies
that the counter-hegemonic characteristics of the norm as it was
originally articulated are left behind. The norm becomes subject to
a process of passive revolution of small, incremental concessions in
order to constrain as much as possible the radical potential of the
norm and its proponents.
5. Conclusion: implications for anti-fossil fuel norms
In this paper I discussed the drivers and constraints of a norm
diffusion. I applied this to the recent emergence of anti-fossil fuel
norms, more speciﬁcally that of fossil fuel divestment. I argued that
four factors are pivotal to understanding a norm’s successful uptake
and diffusion among norm addressees: (legitimacy of) norm en-
trepreneurs, framing strategies and discursive contestation, politi-
cal opportunity structures, and the normative ﬁt with the extant
liberal social structure. The ﬁrst two factors highlight the impor-
tance of agency in norm dynamics and reﬂect the recent turn in
norm scholarship toward a more agency-centred approach [23].
The other two factors provide insights into the structural context in
which norms are formulated and diffused. It urges norm scholars to
consider structural factors that can inhibit or facilitate norm
diffusion. Norm entrepreneurs and norm leaders’ framing strate-
gies are in the ﬁrst place facilitated by political opportunity struc-
tures that they capitalise on. Most importantly, however, these
factors are contingent on whether a norm “ﬁts” with the essential
normative foundations of the extant (neo-)liberal economic struc-
ture. The newly formulated FFD norm must thus speak to the
fundamental market norms of deregulation, privatisation and lib-
eralisation. Consequently, the hegemonic normative and ideational
environment that underpins the (neo)liberal social structure sets
limits on what are considered acceptable ways of addressing social
challenges faced by society.
Hence, a norm will likely be more successful if it acknowledges
the primacy of the market over that of the political realm (or “the
state”). That is, if a norm seeks to achieve social change through the
market the likelihood of successful diffusion increases, since mar-
kets are considered more effective, efﬁcient and proﬁtable. This
follows the growing importance of markets as institutions in the
global political economy. The above analysis agrees with Bern-
stein’s observation that speciﬁc environmental concerns will gain
legitimacy if they are compatible with the kind of economic order
dominant at any given time [27,65]. Therefore, the constructivist
notion of “unconstrained agency” in processes of norm dynamics isnot applicable to the emergence and diffusion of the FFD norm. FFD
rather becomes an investment strategy because of negative eco-
nomic prospects of a fossil fuel industry, rather than a political
strategy to delegitimise the power and practices of immoral actors.
However, as I have outlined above, there is some space for
critical ideas and norms to take root, even in an environment where
framing strategies are employed that must resonate with a con-
ventional ﬁnance audience and that feed into dominant normative
underpinnings of the liberal economic order. After all, if the FFD
norm continues to be diffused and succeeds in widespread insti-
tutionalisation, it will contribute to a change in the collective
standards of what is considered appropriate investment behaviour.
This in itself would represent a cognitive shift in the minds of a set
of crucial actors within the international political economy of the
energy system, and would be a sign of success for the FFD norm.
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